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Jack W. Provonsha Lecture 
CHARACTER, VIRTUE, AND SELF-INTEREST 
IN THE ETHICS OF THE PROFESSIONS 
By 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., Director 
Center for the Advanced Study of Ethics 
and 
John Carroll 
Professor of Medicine and Medical Humanities 
Georgetown University 
Washington, D. C. 
The professions today are afflicted with a species of moral 
.alaise that may prove fatal to their moral identities and perilous to 
our whole society as well. This malaise is manifest in a growing 
conviction even among conscientious doctors, lawyers and 
ministers that it is no longer possible to practice their professions 
within traditional ethical constraints. More specifically, the belief is 
taking hold that unless he looks out for his own self-interest, the 
professional will be crushed by the forces of commercialization, 
competition, government regulations, malpractice, advertising, 
public and media hostility and a host of other inimical socio-
economic forces. 
This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the self-
interest of the professional justifies the compromises in, and even 
the rejection of, obligations imposed by traditional concepts of 
professional ethics. 
I take strong exception to this line of reasoning both in its 
foundations and in its conclusions. I argue to the contrary: 1) that 
what deficiencies there are in professional morality are, as they 
have always been, deficiencies in character and virtue, 2) that a 
firm philosophical foundation exists for altruism and fidelity to trust 
in the ethics of the professions, 3) that professional ethics must at 
times be independent of conventional morality, and 4) that the 
professions are moral communities with enormous moral power 
which, properly used, can sustain the moral integrity of the 
practitioner and the professions. Moreover, if they use their moral 
power well, the professions can become paradigms of dis-
interested service that can raise the level of conventional morality. 
This is an ambitious set of assertions. To speak of character and 
virtue in today's moral climate is to be suspected of sancti-
'Tloniousness or hypocrisy. We must admit that the concepts of 
rtue and character are two of the oldest and slipperiest in moral 
philosophy. Also, the proper place of self-interest in virtue ethics 
has never been sati~factorily settled. Finally, we still lack a 
coherent moral philosophy of the professions in which to locate 
the concepts of character, altruism and self-interest and to define 
the relationships between them. These difficulties notwith-
standing, we cannot avoid engagement with what I take to be the 
central crisis in the professions today-the confusion about who 
and what we are, and what we should be. 
Each of our professions has its own list of morally questionable 
practices that its members would justify on the grounds of 
threatened self-interest. All such practices have three features in 
common: First, they are based on the use of privilege and power 
for the personal gain of the professional. Second, they reflect a 
failure to take certain risks required for the well-being of those 
whom the profession serves. Finally, in the case of both of these 
features, justification is sought on the grounds of legitimate self-
interest. It is my conviction that these practices and the justification 
sought for them derive from the de-emphasis on character and 
virtue in the three professions we are examining. 
In what follows, I examine three questions about the current 
moral malaise of the professions: 1) What are the reasons for the 
erosion of virtue ethics and the moral legitimation of self-interest in 
the ethics of the professions? 2) Is there a philosophical basis for 
restoring virtue ethics to the professions? 3) What are the practical 
and theoretical implications of such a return of virtue ethics? 
Despite numerous efforts since then, no one has improved on 
Aristotle's imperfect, but still useful, definition of virtue. Aristotle 
identifies moral virtues as states of character, by which he means 
" ... the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with 
reference to the passions."(1) Virtue is a particular state of 
character, one which" ... both brings into good condition the thing of 
which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done 
well."(2) And further, "the virtue of a man also will be the state of 
character which makes a man good and which makes him do his 
work well."(3) 
By "ethics ofthe professions", I do not mean the norms actually 
followed by professionals, or the professional codes they 
espouse, but rather the moral obligations deducible from the kinds 
of activity in which they are engaged. The ethics of the profes-
2 
sions, therefore, consists in a rational and systematic ordering of 
the principles, rules, duties and virtues intrinsic to achieving the 
ends to which a profession is dedicated. This is the "internal 
morality" of a profession.(4) 
"Self-interest", too, has several meanings. There is a legitimate 
self-interest which pertains to the duties we owe to ourselves-
duties which guard health, life, some measure of material well-
being, the good of our families, friends, etc.(5) 
Given the nature of professional relationships, some degree of 
effacement of self-interest-which I shall take to mean the same 
as beneficent altruism-is morally obligatory for health pro-
fessionals. 
What Accounts for the Erosion of 
Virtue and the Rise of Self-interest? 
Let me turn now to the first of my three questions: What accounts 
for the erosion of virtue ethics? I would select four factors: a) the 
unresolved conceptual tension between virtue and self-interest, 
b) the conceptual difficulties of virtue ethics itself, c) the modern 
turn in ethics from the character of the moral agent to the 
resolution of dilemmas, and d) the shift in economic and political 
values in the last decade. 
The tension between self-interest and virtue was recognized at 
the beginning of western moral philosophy. Plato has Socrates 
confront this dilemma in the Republic when Thrasymachus 
asserts that "justice is nothing but the interest of the stronger."(6) 
Glaucon for his part contends that man by nature pursues self-
interest and is deflected only by law-an idea also advanced by 
other ethical "relativists" like Thucydides and Gorgias. Callicles 
goes further and insists that virtue consists in acting selfishly and 
tyranically. W. K. C. Guthrie shows how persistent the idea of 
self-interest and self-love was in the thought of the Sophists.(7) 
Aristotle too had difficulties with the reality of self-interest and its 
reconciliation with his doctrine of moral virtue. He asks if one 
should love one's self primarily, or one's neighbor.(8) At one point, 
he tries to show, like so many philosophers after, that acting to 
benefit others contributes to happiness and therefore is in one's 
own self-interest.(9) But this is a weak argument because Aristotle 
also asserts that the truly virtuous person ought to practice 
altruism for its own sake.(10) In his interesting analysis of this 
problem in Books VIII and IX of the Eudemian Ethics, Engberg-
Pedersen concludes that Aristotle's position is that justice is the 
basis of all the virtues. The virtuous person assigns no more of 
natural goods to himself than to others. In this way he encom-
passes altruism, places restraints on inordinate self-interest and 
serves legitimate self-interest.(11 ) 
Despite the unresolved difficulties of dealing with the reality of 
self-interest, the ethics of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics placed the 
emphasis squarely on virtues. Virtue ethics dominated classical 
and Hellenistic moral philosophy. It came to its highest develop-
ment in the moral philosophy of Aquinas who joined the super-
natural to the natural virtues. Thus the classical and medieval 
philosophies of virtue constituted a continuum. 
This continuum centered on a conception ofthe virtuous person 
as one who exhibited the traits of character essential to human 
flourishing and to optimal fulfillment of the capabilities inherent in 
human nature. For such a person, self-interest was recognized as 
a responsibility but it was to be submerged to varying degrees by 
noble acts in the interests of others. The good life called for a 
rational balance between personal good and the good of 
others.(12) Butthe cardinal virtues-temperance, justice, courage 
and prudence-all implied some degree of effacement of self-
interest as a mark of the virtuous person. At a minimum the 
virtuous person was not to take advantage of the vulnerability of 
others. As examples: Socrates chose death to teach a moral 
lesson to his fellow Athenians; Plato distinguished the art 
making money from the art of healing;(13) Cicero admonishes t 
corn merchant not to raise prices when the crop is small;(14) 
Hippocrates makes beneficient concern for the welfare of his 
patients the first principle of medical ethics.(15) Thus, while they 
recognized the reality of self-interest, the ancient and medieval 
moral philosophers held firmly to virtue as the touchstone of the 
moral life. 
In the post-medieval period two philosophical assaults were 
launched on virtue ethics, one by Machiavelli and the other 
by Thomas Hobbes. Both are conceptual descendants of 
Thrasymachus, Callicles and the anti-virtue pre-Socratics. Both 
replaced the optimistic view of human nature with moral 
pessimism. Both found the traditional concepts of virtue anti-
thetical to human nature and self-interest. Machiavelli simply 
converted the traditional virtues into vices, while Hobbes psycho-
logized them as a form of self-interest. The Machiavellian and 
Hobbesian strains are the heart of today's moral malaise and 
cynicism which seeks to give moral legitimacy to the profes-
sionals' self-interest. 
Machiavelli (1469-1527) was too well-educated in classical 
humanism to deny totally the value of virtue as an ideal in human 
conduct. But his observation ofthe real world in which men lived-
in warfare, tyranny and political upheaval-convinced him that 
there was no survival value in living virtuously. The good man 
simply could not thrive in a world in which so many others were not 
good.(16) And so Machiavelli advised the Prince who would be 
successful to use whatever means would ensure his survival and 
the continuance of his power. The classical cardinal virtues of 
temperance, justice, even at times fortitude and prudence, coulrl 
be impediments when dealing with those who ignored the 
constraints on self-interest. In these circumstances the virtues 
thus became vices. Moreover, on the Machiavellian view, virtue 
itself became an instrumental notion, a power to effect a given end 
rather than a behavioral ideal. Indeed, for Machiavelli virtue 
became virtu, "manliness"-an expression of power rather than a 
disposition to act well as it was understood in the classical-
medieval continuum. 
Bernard Mandeville (1670-1773), a phYSician, went further than 
Machiavelli in some ways. Not only did he think the virtues were 
impractical, but he held them to be vices-destructive not only for 
personal but social good. It is through greed, the desire for luxury, 
pleasure, and power that society prospers and things get done. 
The satisfaction of acquisitiveness, intemperance, and gluttony 
makes for jobs, puts money into the economy and provides a 
livelihood for many.(17) Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," whether 
tongue-in-cheek or not, has been influential in encouraging an 
anti-virtue bias which has always found supporters and has many 
today. 
Nietzsche's (1844-1900) anti-virtue stance was of a differ-
ent kind but still in the Machiavellian spirit. For Nietzsche's 
"ubermensch", the traditional virtues were meaningless. They 
were simply impediments to the achievement of greatness. The 
virtues were for lesser mortals. For the superman, virtues like 
temperance or justice would be vices.(18) 
A more modern exponent of a similar moral viewpoint is Ayn 
Rand. Her ideas, though far less well-argued than those of 
Machiavelli, Mandeville or Nietzsche, are a current compound of 
all three. Rand's novels of the successful architect or industrialist 
extol the "virtues" of individualism, ruthlessness, power, an 
uninhibited pursuit of wealth and self-interest.(19) Her ideas havb 
had a considerable influence on those who seek moral justi-
fication for their acquisitive instincts. In this regard it is interesting 
to note that the slogan of Regardie's magazine is "money, power, 
greed." 
Moral Machiavellianism-whether in its original version or its 
later varieties in Mandeville, Nietzsche, or Rand-is very much 
lve today. We see it in the medical entrepreneurs who own pitals or nursing homes, the lawyer-power broker who sells I luence or leveraged buyouts, in the multi-million dollar 
ministries. Indeed, all who hold that virtue simply does not pay and 
that it is a fool's enterprise are moral Machiavellians. 
Machiavelli made the virtues into vices. Thomas Hobbes (1588-
1679), on the other hand, tried to maintain some idea of virtue 
which was reconcilable with self-interest. His was a formal 
philosophical break with the medieval tradition. His aim was to 
establish ethics on purely naturalistic grounds, free of the 
theological spirit that characterized the medieval synthesis. He 
built his moral philosophy on a pessimistic view of human nature 
that departed sharply from the essentially optimistic classical-
medieval view. 
Aristotle opens his Politics by asserting that man is a social 
animal. Man, Hobbes said, was unsocial by nature. He enters 
society only to satisfy his mostfundamental urges. His selfishness 
is primary and is expressed in a desire to preserve his own life, 
enhance pleasure, avoid pain, and become secure from attack by 
others. Hobbes does not make the virtues into vices, rather he puts 
them at the service of self-interest. We pity others because we see 
the possibility of being in the position of those we pity. We are 
benevolent either because it gives us power or it will assure us 
benevolence in return. "All society" he said, "is for gain or 
glory."(20) We obey society's rules only because we feel if we do 
not, others will threaten our security. On Hobbes' view, effacement 
of self-interest is unnatural, because it makes us the victims of 
others. Self-interest determines what is good and bad. But self-
interest alone will not secure a peaceable society. That must 
fi ally be secured by an absolute sovereign, or society will be torn 
rt by competing self-interests. 
obbes' view on self-interest was coupled with a scorn for the 
good which had been vital to classical and medieval philosophy. If 
the good is reducible to what we like or dislike, as Hobbes 
suggested, then virtues and vices are also matters of preference. 
Hobbes' powerful assertions shaped much of English moral 
philosophy. His successors tried either to rebut the primacy of 
self-interest or reconcile it with some more altruistic principle. 
John Locke (1632-1704), for example, agreed with Hobbes that 
good and evil are determined by pain or pleasure or conformity to 
some law. He did assert that we ought to help others but only if it 
did not endanger our own self-interest. Shaftesbury (1671-1713) 
tried hard to show that self-interest and service to others were 
synonymous. Virtues, he said, "payoff" in self-interest because of 
the pleasure we get from benevolent acts. The vices like anger, 
intemperance, and covetousness, on the other hand, bring pain. 
Shaftesbury thought that we ought to embrace virtue because we 
have an obligation to protect self-interest, so that affection for 
virtue is really affection for self-interest. Hutcheson (1694-1746) 
developed Shaftesbury's moral-sense theory more fully, as did 
Hume (1711-1776). They identified virtue as that which gives the 
spectator of virtuous acts a feeling of approbation, while vicious 
acts elicit disapproval. They took some of the bluntness out of 
Hobbes' emphasis in self-interest. But they end up agreeing that 
we have no ultimate obligation to virtue other than its bearing on 
our self-interest or happiness. Adam Smith (1723-1790), too, 
holds that virtues are those traits of character that are useful or 
agreeable to the moral sentiment of the agent or others. Bentham 
(1748-1832) argued that whatever is conducive to the general 
f,>piness always conduces to the happiness of the agent. In this 
,niy his utilitarianism reconciles self-regarding and other-
regarding interests by subsuming all of these interests under the 
principle of greatest happiness. J. S. Mill (1806-1873) went further 
than Bentham positing that the greatest good of all is the source of 
one's own happiness. One's own self-interest, therefore, is best 
served by acting for the good of all. On this view, consciously 
doing without happiness to achieve the greatest good of all is 
paradoxically a source of happiness.(21 ) 
In contrast with the moral sentiment, theorists and the utilitar-
ians, the Cambridge intuitionists like Cudworth (1617-1688), 
Henry More (1614-1687), and Cumberland (1631-1718) tried to 
show that there were reasons for virtuous acts even if they 
conflicted with self-interest. More even postulated a "Boniform 
faculty", a virtue that gives us mastery over our baser impulses to 
serve selfish interests first.(22) 
Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) took issue with both 
Shaftesbury and Hobbes. Neither self-love nor benevolence were 
the only affections involved in human behavior. Altruism and 
self-interest do not completely exclude other desires and motiva-
tions. Nor are benevolence and self-interest mutually exclusive. 
Man has a conscience which enables him to order his passions so 
that he can do what is good not just for self. By conscience man 
can know how much benevolence will advance and how much will 
damage his self-interest. Butler was a cleric and looked to God to 
implant conscience in humans to point out what action is most in 
conformity with human nature. Thus conscience enables us t6 
know that some things are inherently good and some inherently 
bad. Butler thus invoked theology implicitly if not always explicitly, 
though he tried, as did Hobbes, to extract his moral philosophy 
from reason.(23) 
Enough has been said to demonstrate how the question of 
altruism and self-intetest arose in Hobbes and Machiavelli and 
established two powerful strains of thought with which moral 
philosophy has been occupied ever since. As I pointed out earlier, 
the problem arose in ancient philosophy as well. In Christian moral 
philosophy as enunciated by Aquinas, self-preservation was built 
into natural law. What is owed to self and what is owed to others 
was ordered by the virtue of charity. Indeed, it may be that this is 
the only way in which the inherent tensions between self-interest 
and altruism can ever be finally resolved. 
These tensions certainly have not been resolved in twentieth 
century moral philosophy. The subjectivism and emotivism of 
Ayer, the prescriptivism of Hare, the existentialism of Sartre-all 
make moral judgment matters of approval or disapproval, prefer-
ence, or self-determination. The metaethical emphasis on 
language and logic of moral discourse rather than the content of 
moral judgments further weakened the classical notions of virtue 
so that the definition of virtue has become either so vague as to be 
meaningless or so encompassing as to include every conceivable 
likable trait.(24) 
Twentieth-century moralists have refined the eighteenth-
century notion of moral sentiment and further psychologized 
ethics. In the light of the psychologies of Freud orthe behaviorism 
of Watson or Skinner, today many moralists look to modern 
psychology to define the virtues and to close the gap between 
knowing the good and being motivated to do the good. Others look 
to genetics, culture or social organization to explain altruism and 
self-interest.(25) Nagel, on the other hand, presents a Kantian 
challenge to this trend and argues for the rationality of altruism. In 
doing so, he rejects the Humean subordination of reason to desire 
or emotion.(26) Philippa Foot tried unsuccessfully to link virtue and 
self-interest in her work Virtues and Vices. 
The disarray of normative ethics, including the destruction of 
virtue ethics, has occasioned a spate of recent attempts to 
resuscitate the classical and especially the Aristotelian idea of 
virtue. This move was initiated by Anscombe(27) and 
Maclntyre.(28) Their success varies, and the extent to which they 
can reverse the dominance of self-interest in ethics begun by 
Hobbes is highly problematic. 
The second major factor in the erosion of virtue ethics is the 
philosophical difficulty inherent in the concept of virtue itself. First, 
is its lack of specificity. Virtue ethics does not tell us how to resolve 
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specific moral dilemmas. It de-emphasizes principles, rules, 
duties and concrete prescriptions. It only says that the virtuous 
person will be disposed to act in accord with the virtue appropriate 
to the situation. This lack of specificity leads to a distressing 
circularity in reasoning. The right and the good is that which the 
virtuous person would do, and the virtuous person is one who 
would do the right and the good. We must define either the right 
and the good or the virtuous person if we are to break out of this 
logical impasse. 
Furthermore, virtue theory cannot stand apart from some theory 
of human nature and the good. The more vague our definitions of 
human nature and its telos, the more difficult it is to keep virtue 
from becoming vice and vice virtue. Since virtue ethics puts its 
emphasis on the character of the agent, it requires a consistent 
philosophical anthropology, otherwise, it easily becomes sub-
jectivist, emotivist, relativist and self-destructive. 
Further difficulties include the relations of intent to outward 
behavior. Is good intention a criterion of a virtuous person? How 
do we determine intention? Can a good intention absolve the 
agent of responsibility for an act which ends in harm-a physician 
telling a patient the truth out of the virtue of honesty, and thereby 
precipitating a serious depression or even suicide? Few are 
virtuous all the time. How many lapses move us from the virtuous 
to the continent, incontinent, or vicious category? How does virtue 
ethics connect with duty- and principle-based ethics which give 
the objectivity virtue ethics seems to lack? 
Classical ethics in the East and the West have usually 
eschewed systems of rules or principles or at least subordinated 
them to the notion of moral character. Where do virtue and 
supererogation meet? Are virtues synonymous with duties? Is 
supererogation merely a higher degree of virtue? Why are some 
people virtuous and others not? Must we turn to sociobiology for 
the answer as some suggest?(29) Are virtues genetically 
ingrained, mere survival mechanisms designed to propagate the 
gene pool? 
In spite of its ancient lineage, these fundamental questions are 
yet to be answered. Because they have not been answered to 
everyone's satisfaction, moralists have turned to something more 
probable-to the question, what shall I do? How do I solve this 
dilemma before me now? 
This brings me to the third point I want to mention with regard to 
the erosion of virtue ethics, namely the turn-particularly in 
professional ethics-toward quandary and dilemma solving. This 
is the result of a number of factors operating in the last two 
decades. One is the concreteness and urgency of the new ethical 
issues arising in scientific advance and socio-political change. 
Medical and biological progress, for example, challenges tradi-
tional ethics. Yet these developments must be confronted without 
the ethical compass points of a consensus on values or common 
religious beliefs. We are now a morally heterogeneous society, 
divided on the mostfundamental ethical issues, particularly about 
the meaning of life and death. Without a common conception of 
human nature we cannot agree on what constitutes a good life and 
the virtues that oughtto characterize it. As a result, the ethics of the 
professions, especially of the medical profession, has turned to 
the analysis of dilemmas and of the process of ethical decision-
making. For many, ethics consists primarily in a balancing of 
rights, duties and prima facie principles and the resolution of 
conflicts among them. Procedural ethics has replaced normative 
ethics. This avoids the impasses generated when patients, clients 
and professionals hold fundamentally opposing moral viewpoints. 
But analysis cannot substitute for character and virtue even 
though it provides conceptual clarity. Moral acts are the acts of 
human agents. Their quality is determined by the characters of the 
persons doing the analysis. Character shapes the way we define a 
moral problem, selects what we think is an ethical issue, and 
decides which principles, values and technical details are 
determinative. 
It makes a very great difference, therefore, whether a pro-
fessional is motivated by self-interest or altruism. Given th 
realities of professional relationships, the character of the pr 
fessional cannot be eliminated from its central position and that is 
why virtue ethics must be restored as the keystone of the ethics of 
the professions. 
A fourth and final factor eroding a virtue approach in the medical 
profession is the legitimation in public attitude and tolerance of 
self-interest. In response to the economic imperatives acting so 
forcefully on the health care system, physicians and other 
providers have been encouraged to compete with each other. The 
availability, cost, and quality of health services have been turned 
over increasingly to market forces. The Federal Trade Com-
mission has classified the professions (yours and mine) as 
businesses and made them subject to one ordering principle-the 
preservation of competition.(30) Health providers have been 
encouraged to become entrepreneurs, to invest in health-care 
facilities and technologies, to be offered bonuses for keeping 
utilization of health-care resources to a minimum. Without these 
incentives, it is argued, the best will not enter medicine, or will retire 
early. Medical progress would stop and new services would 
cease to be available. For the first time in medical history, self-
interest has been given legal and moral legitimation, and profit has 
been turned into a professional virtue. These trends are making 
the physician into a businessman, an entrepreneur, a proletarian, 
a gatekeeper, a bureaucrat. Never has there been more confusion 
about who and what it is to be a physician. 
II 
Is There A Philosophical Basis for 
Restoring Virtue Ethics? 
This brings me to my second major question: Is there a sound 
philosophical foundation in the nature of professional activity for 
resolving the tension between altru ism and self-interest in favor of 
virtue and character? I believe there is, and I would ground my 
proposal in six characteristics of the relationship of professionals 
with · those who seek their help. Individually, none of these 
phEmonema is unique in kind or degree. They may exist 
individually in other human relationships and occupations. But, as 
a moral cluster, they are, in fact, unique and generate a kind of 
"internal morality" -a grounding for the ethics of the professions 
that is in some way impervious to vacillations in philosophical 
fashions, as well as social, economic or political change. This 
internal morality explains why the ethics of medicine, for example, 
remained until two decades ago firmly rooted in the ethics of 
character and virtue. This was true of the medical ethics of the 
Hippocratic school and the Stoics. It is found in the seminal texts of 
Moslem, Jewish and Christian medical moralists. It persisted in the 
18th century in the writings of John Gregory, Thomas Percival and 
Samuel Bard, who, although cognizant of the philosophies of 
Hobbes, Adam Smith and Hume, nonetheless maintained the 
traditional dedication of the profession tothe welfare of the patient 
and to a certain set of virtues. Only in the last two decades has 
there been (to use Hume's terms) a "sentiment of approbation" 
regarding self-interest. 
The first distinguishing characteristic of professional relation-
ships is the dependence, vulnerability and eminent exploitability of 
the person who seeks the help of a physician, lawyer d 
clergyman. The person in need of help to restore health, receivb 
justice or rectify his relationships with God is anxious, in distress 
and driven by fear. To avoid death, damnation, or incarceration, he 
is impelled to seek help, though he wishes he could avoid it. He is 
not free to puruse life's other goals until help is forthcoming. 
The second characteristic of professional relationships is their 
inherent inequality. The professional possesses the knowledge 
~ --·'."'-at the patient or client needs. This places the preponderance of 
;wer in his hands. He can use it well or poorly, for good or evil, for 
service or self-interest. How can we speak, as some do, of the 
professional relationship as a "contract" when one party is so 
dependent upon the other's services? 
The third characteristic of professional relationships is their 
special fiduciary character. In a state of vulnerability(31) and 
inequality, we are forced to trust our physicians, lawyers or 
ministers. We are ill equipped to evaluate their competence. We 
are forced to reveal our intimate selves-baring our bodies, our 
personal lives, our souls and our failings to another person who is 
a stranger. Without these invasions of our privacy, we cannot be 
healed or helped. Moreover, the professional invites our trust. 
Professionals begin their relationship with us with the question: 
How can I help you? Implicitly they are saying, "I have the 
knowledge you need; trust me to have it and to use it in your best 
interests." In the case of medicine, that promise is made in a public 
oath atthe time of graduation when the graduate announces to all 
present that, henceforth, he can be trusted to serve interests other 
than his own. It is repeated in the codes of medicine and other 
professions and the ordination rites of clergymen. 
Indeed, it is this public declaration that defines a true "profes-
sion" and separates it from other occupations. The very word 
comes from the Latin profiteri, to declare aloud, to accept publicly 
a special way of life, one that promises that the profession can be 
trusted to act in other than its own interest. Businessmen and 
craftsmen ask to be trusted, but not at cost to themselves. Caveat 
emptor can never be the first principle of a profession. 
Fourth, the knowledge of true professionals, as I have just 
(j ~E(fined them, cannot be wholly proprietary. Their knowledge is 
~ ained to a practical end, to meeting certain fundamental 
uman needs. Professional knowledge does not exist for its own 
sake. This is clearest in medicine where society permits invasions 
of privacy that would otherwise be criminal in order that physicians 
may be trained. Thus, medical students, who are not fully skilled 
are permitted to dissect human bodies, attend and assist at 
autopsies and operations, and participate in the care of sick 
people. They are allowed literally to practice, albeit under 
supervision. Surgeons in training take many years to develop their 
skills. Their first operations are hardly as proficient as those which 
follow. Attending patients involves delays, diffusion of responsi-
bility and accountability, and discomfort and even physical risk for 
the patient. Society permits these invasions of privacy and the 
risks attached to them, not primarily so physicians can make a 
living but because society needs an uninterrupted supply of 
doctors. Medical knowledge, and analogously, legal and clerical 
knowledge, are held in trust for those who need them. They can 
never be solely dispensed for the profit of the professional or on 
terms unilaterally set by him or her. That is why lawyers are 
officers ofthe court, and clergymen are ordained to minister in the 
name of God or their churches. 
The fifth feature of the professional relationship is that the 
professional is the final common pathway through which help and 
harm must pass. The final decisions, actions, and recommen-
dations must be made by one person, the professional, with whom 
the patient or client has a convenantal relationship of trust. 
The sixth distinguishing characteristic feature of professional 
relationships is that the professional is a member of a moral 
community, that is, a collective human association whose 
~ Jembers share the privileges of special knowledge and together 
-pledge their dedication to use it to advance health, justice or 
salvation. Together the members of the moral community make 
the same promises andelicitthe same trust they do as individuals. 
They are bound by the same fidelity to the promise they have 
collectively made and the trust they have collectively elicited. The 
professional is, therefore, not a moral island. He belongs to a 
group which has been given a monopoly on special knowledge 
and holds it in trust for all who need it. Each professional is 
responsible to his colleagues, and they are together responsible 
for him. Collectively they are responsible for fidelity to the trust they 
have solicited from society. This is what the privilege of self-
regulation means-not that each professional is his own judge of 
what is ethically permissible. 
These features regarding human relationships are the com-
ponents of the "internal morality" of the professions, the immediate 
moral ground for their obligations, and the source of definition of 
their virtues. To use Aristotle's terminology, those virtues make the 
work of the professions "be well done." 
The virtues of professional life are many, but I believe they are 
reducible, primarily to two-fidelity to trust and beneficence, which 
follows from the virtue of fidelity to trust. These two traits of 
character are the ethical foundations upon which the other virtues 
and principles of professional ethics depend. Clearly, they are 
incompatible with the Machiavellian and Hobbesian doctrines of 
self-interest. Their reality and irreducibility provide the most 
powerful argument for the restoration of virtue ethics in profes-
sional morality.(32) 
III 
What Are the Practical 
Implications of Virtue Ethics? 
If there is validity in the philosophical foundations of profes-
sional morality as I have argued, a number of practical implica-
tions follow which are pertinent to healing the moral malaise and 
confusion of today's professionals. 
First, professionals cannot displace the moral failings of the 
professions on others-on society, other professions, govern-
ment, economics, the market place, etc. No one can make the 
conscientious professional do what he thinks is not in the interests 
of his patient or client. Can anyone force doctors to follow a policy 
damaging to their interests? The fact that the professional is the 
final common pathway for all policies and decisions and actions 
forces him to be the guardian of the interests of his patient or client. 
Indeed he invited that responsibility when he invited the patient or 
client to trust him. 
As a result, individual practitioners must be very careful in 
exonerating themselves from morally dubious practices on the 
basis of survival. Professional ethics will have no future only if it is 
gradually suffocated by the moral compromises of individual 
professionals. There will be times when, as guardians of the 
patients' welfare, physicians will have a moral obligation to refuse: 
they will refuse to "dump" the patient who cannot pay; they will 
refuse to discharge the patient before he is ready; they will refuse 
to act as society's fiscal agents; they will refuse to be seduced by 
the profits of investments and ownership of health facilities or 
bonuses for denying or delaying needed care; they will refuse to 
be gatekeepers, exceptto protecttheir patients from unnecessary 
medical interventions or procedures.(33) The physician of char-
acter will be the one who can reliably be expected to exhibit the 
virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of self-interest.(34) 
The second practical implication is that the individual profes-
sional must not be expected to stand by when the well-being of his 
patient or client is threatened. It is an obligation of the professions 
as moral communities to be advocates for those they serve and to 
take collective action to assure that their services are available 
and accessible to all, to protect those in need of healing, justice or 
salvation against public legislation or institutional policies that may 
harm them. 
The professions as moral communities must also take the 
responsibility for each member's ethical behavior seriously 
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enough to monitor, discipline and even remove each other when 
the canons of professional morality are violated. Think of the 
enormous moral power the professions could exert if they were 
truly the advocates of those they serve. Suppose that, in addition, 
all the helping professions were to join their efforts. Could any 
society resist? Can they do less? In the face ofthis power, can any 
of the three great professions blame society for their own moral 
lassitude?(35) 
A third implication is that the formation of character is as 
important in the education of professionals as their technical 
education. Although this was a major concern of professional 
education in the past, it has now been forsaken. People have 
asked ever since Plato raised the question in the Meno: Can virtue 
be taught? I believe it can. Obviously, the whole task of character 
formation cannot be left to the professional schools. Families, 
churches, and schools, all shape the character of students long 
before they enter professional schools. But these schools must 
also teach what it is to be a good physician, lawyer or clergyman-
what kind of person the good professional ought to be. Much can 
be done in character formation when a student is motivated by his 
desire to be a good professional even if his education prior to 
medical, law school, or seminary was morally neutral or deficient. 
The most effective instruments of character formation are the 
professionals who teach in medical and law schools and 
seminaries. But they must be able to demonstrate that com-
petence and character are inseparable, and that fidelity to trust 
and self-effacement can be, and must be, indispensable traits of 
the authentic profession. Unfortunately not enough professional 
school faculty members are convinced of this; nor are enough 
morally equipped to serve as models of virtue. 
Paradigm cases of ethically sensitive professionals drawn from 
the history and tradition of each profession are also helpful. They 
are more effective than is generally realized. One of the tragedies 
of medical history is its depreciation of the lives of the great 
physicians. While biographies may not have much fascination for 
sophisticated medical historians, they still have inspirational value 
for aspirants to medicine. Other professions have their morally 
paradigmatic biographies as well. Most professional students 
enter with some ideal of service in mind which the professional 
school has a responsibility to reinforce. 
A fourth implication is that cure of the moral malaise of the 
professions requires something more than reordering the social 
organization, or tailoring the semantic and semiotic feature of 
professional codes as Kultgen rather naively supposes.(36) What 
failings there are in the professions are failings in character and 
not in the language of our codes. If character and virtue are 
restored, the appropriate social reorganizations will follow-not 
the other way around. 
Finally, there are theoretical reasons as well for a restoration of 
virtue, both in general and professional ethics. Happily a renais-
sance of interest among moral philosophers in this subject is very 
much in evidence. But virtue ethics must not be seen as self-
sufficient or as antithetical to principle- or duty-based systems of 
the analysis of ethical dilemmas. The theoretical challenge is to 
develop the logical connections between analytical and virtue 
ethics, between principles and character, to close the gap 
between cognition ofthe right and good and the motivation to do it, 
and in the light of my whole discussion, to strike the morally 
defensible balance between self-interest and its effacement 
which recognizes the primacy of altruistic beneficence. 
The theoretical challenges will be complicated because virtue 
and duty-based ethics are today isolated from a more com-
prehensive moral philosophy which could tell us why we must be 
moral and what we define as the moral life. We need to reconnect 
ethics to some notion of the good and to a coherent philosophical 
anthropology. To this end, it might be well to re-examine the 
classical medieval synthesis before ethics was torn from its roots 
in moral philosophy. That synthesis, amplified by our newer 
knowledge of human nature, derived from the biological and 
social sciences and reflected upon theologically, might provide 
the new resuscitation that an effective virtue ethics demands. 
For the time being, a reflection on the nature of professional 
relationships can be fruitful even in the absence of a compre-
hensive moral philosophy of which it might be a part. The internal 
morality of the professions based on the realities of professional 
relationships is clear enough to help us repair the ozone hole 
opened in the fabric of professional ethics, even if we cannot 
repair the whole moral atmosphere on which our society depends 
for its survival. 
I have emphasized what I believe to be some of the elements 
common to the moral philosophy of our three professions of 
medicine, law and ministry. Many of these same features are 
shared by other professions. I must leave them to decide how the 
virtues of fidelity to trust and effacement of self-interest apply to 
them. Suppose all the professions were to acknowledge virtue as 
a ground for moral accountability. Would this not be the leaven for 
raising the standards of conventional morality as well? 
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Minnesota Bioethics Retreat and Conference 
Over an extended weekend last July, 
thirty-five bioethicists from across the 
country gathered at a resort in Minnesota 
for a retreat. The purpose for the gather-
ing was to allow an informal setting for 
minimally structured discussion of sub-
stantive bioethical issues as well as 
pedagogical and administrative matters. 
The meeting was convened by Arthur 
Caplan, director of the Center for Bio-
medical Ethics at the University of 
Minnesota. 
The setting was idyllic-the rolling hills 
of Minnesota along Lake Superior. We 
were housed in a large resort on the 
bank of the lake with some of us-
particularly those with accompanying 
family members-having accommoda-
tions in surrounding lake cottages. Meals 
were taken in the common resort dining 
room. Although no formal papers were 
read, there were participants who shared 
reports (Peggy Battin of the University of 
Utah had just returned from the Nether-
lands where she had studied the Dutch 
policy of active euthanasia), ideas from 
working papers (Bruce Jennings of the 
Hastings Center shared some provoca-
tive ideas on the concept of democracy 
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by James Walters 
in health-care decision making), and 
challenges (Daniel Wikler of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin invited us to consider 
involvement in bringing greater equity to 
the distribution of health care in the 
country). Although sessions started at 
9 a.m. and some went informally past 
midnight, there was ample time for 
fellowship at meals and recreation at 
periods during the day. 
I must admit that the highlight in the 
conference for me was an afternoon 
canoeing trip in the "boundary waters"-
a large protected expanse of thousands 
of finger lakes which dominate northern 
Minnesota. A group of a dozen of us took 
four canoes in a circular trip portaging 
between a series of small pristine lakes. 
The composition of the canoeing group 
typified the delightful diversity of the 
larger gathering: three philosophers, 
three physicians, one ethicist, one attor-
ney and three young people accom-
panying parents. (My daughter Wendy, 
age 12, thoroughly enjoyed being 
paddled through this natural paradise by 
her dad and a pediatrician from 
Wisconsin!) 
Ethical issues in xenograft transplants 
were among the topics discussed at the 
"Fourth International Symposium on 
Organ Procurement and Preservation" 
held September 17-24 in Minneapolis. 
George Annas of Boston University, Eric 
Rose of Columbia Presbyterian Medical 
Center, New York, and I gave presen-
tations on the ethics of xenograft 
transplantation. 
George Annas, a professor of law and 
a prolific writer on bioethical themes, 
gave a brief history of xenograft trans-
plantation and dwelt on the need for 
regulation of emerging medical tech-
nologies. Annas drew on the Nuremberg 
Code which gives guidelines for human 
experimentation as a foundation for his 
presentation. The law professor said his 
plea for appropriate regulations was not 
so much addressed to the medical 
community as to fellow attorneys and 
bioethicists. Further, he indicated that 
transplant surgeons should push the 
limits in performing their unique role , 
serving their patients. Government and 
bioethics should produce appropriate 
guidelines for protecting the larger good 
of society, said Annas. 
Eric Rose, a transplant surgeon who is 
a leading advocate of xenograft trans-
plantion, addressed medical aspects of 
xenograft experimentation. A basic point 
in Rose's lecture was that the primary 
hurdle to any full-fledged program of 
xenograft transplantation is the hyper-
acute humoral immune response which 
increases as the species that are in-
volved in the operation are more dis-
parate. Rose has changed his focus from 
operating procedures regarding higher-
level primates to addressing immunolog-
ical rejection issues associated with 
cross-species transplantation to humans 
from goats and sheep. 
I argued for a consistent ethic of all 
sentient life-human life particularly, but 
animal life more generally. I called for an 
ethic which recognizes a hierarchy of 
value dependent on an animal's capa-
city for intensity of experience by making 
three specific points: First, xenografts 
promise to be an undisputed good 1" 
humanity. If animals could become tl 
"spare parts" factories for humans, 
potentially thousands of persons could 
live better and longer. Second, xeno-
grafts are not the ideal answer because 
of the sacrifice of primate lives. There is 
something revolting in the idea of raising 
primates in "farms" and "feeding lots" for 
calculated death, I believe. Third, the 
ideal answer to the transplant organ 
shortage is use of dead persons-all 
dead persons. In light of the history of 
evolving definitions of death, I suggested 
that we re-examine our current notion of 
whole brain death and give further study 
to the appropriateness of a neocortical 
definition of death. 
The chairman of the organizing com-
mittee was John S. Najarian, director of 
transplantation atthe University of Minne-
sota Medical Center. Over 700 physi-
cians from 32 countries attended the 
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